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PAPER
Cyber–Physical Security of a
Smart Grid Infrastructure
The authors of this paper discuss the limitations of advances, measures
to make the smart grid secure, and also to assure continuous
power flows and dynamic power pricing.
By Yilin Mo, Tiffany Hyun-Jin Kim, Kenneth Brancik, Dona Dickinson,
Heejo Lee, Adrian Perrig, and Bruno Sinopoli
ABSTRACT | It is often appealing to assume that existing
solutions can be directly applied to emerging engineering do-
mains. Unfortunately, careful investigation of the unique chal-
lenges presented by new domains exposes its idiosyncrasies,
thus often requiring new approaches and solutions. In this
paper, we argue that the Bsmart[ grid, replacing its incredibly
successful and reliable predecessor, poses a series of new se-
curity challenges, among others, that require novel approaches
to the field of cyber security. We will call this new field cyber–
physical security. The tight coupling between information and
communication technologies and physical systems introduces
new security concerns, requiring a rethinking of the commonly
used objectives and methods. Existing security approaches are
either inapplicable, not viable, insufficiently scalable, incom-
patible, or simply inadequate to address the challenges posed
by highly complex environments such as the smart grid. A con-
certed effort by the entire industry, the research community,
and the policy makers is required to achieve the vision of a
secure smart grid infrastructure.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The electric grid is arguably the world’s largest engineered
system. Vital to human life, its reliability is a major and
often understated accomplishment of humankind. It is the
motor of the economy and the major driver of progress. In
its current state, the grid consists of four major compo-
nents: 1) generation produces electric energy in different
manners, e.g., by burning fossil fuels, inducing nuclear
reaction, harnessing water (hydro-electric dams), wind,
solar, and tidal forces; 2) transmission moves electricity via
a very high voltage infrastructure; 3) distribution steps
down current and spreads out for consumption; and
4) consumption, i.e., industrial, commercial, and residen-
tial, uses the electric energy in a multitude of ways.
Given the wide variety of systems, their numerous
owners, and a diverse range of regulators, a number of
weaknesses have emerged. Outages are often recognized
only after consumers report. Matching generation to de-
mand is challenging because utilities do not have clear cut
methods to predict demand and to request demand reduc-
tion (load shedding). As a consequence, they need to
overgenerate power for peak demandVwhich is expensive
and contributes to Green-house Gas (GhG) emissions. For
similar reasons it is difficult to incorporate variable gene-
ration, such as wind and solar power, into the grid. Last,
there is a dearth of information available for consumers to
determine how and when to use energy.
To address these challenges, the smart grid concept has
evolved. The smart grid uses communications and infor-
mation technologies to provide better Bsituational aware-
ness[ to utilities regarding the state of the grid. Smart grid
provides numerous benefits [1]–[4]. Using intelligent
communications, load shedding can be implemented so
that peak demand can be flattened, which reduces the
need to bring additional (expensive) generation plants on-
line. Using information systems to perform predictive
analysis, including when wind and solar resources will
produce less power, the utilities can keep power appro-
priately balanced. As new storage technologies emerge at
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wise benefit from intelligent demand prediction. Last, the
abilityforconsumerstoreceiveandrespondtopricesignals
will help them manage their energy costs, while helping
utilities avoid building additional generation plants.
With all these approaches, the smart grid enables a
drastic cost reduction for both power generation and
consumption.
Dynamic pricing and distributed generation with local
generators can significantly reduce the electricity bill.
Fig. 1(a) shows how to use electricity during off-peak pe-
riods when the price is low. Conversely, Fig. 1(b) shows
load shedding during peak times and utilization of energy
storage to meet customer demand. The effect of peak de-
mand reduction by Bdemand management[ is shown in
Fig. 2. Pilot projects in the states of California and
Washington [1] indicate that scheduling appliances based
on price information can reduce electricity costs by 10%
for consumers. More advanced smart grid technologies
promise to provide even larger savings.
To establish the smart grid vision, widespread sensing
and communications between all grid components (gene-
ration, transmission, distribution, storage) and consumers
must be created and managed by information technology
systems.Furthermore,sophisticatedestimation,control,and
pricing algorithms need to be implemented to support the
increasing functionality of the grid while maintaining
reliable operations. It is the greatly increased incorporation
of IT systems that supports the vision, but unfortunately also
creates exploitable vulnerabilities for the grid and its users.
A. A Cyber–Physical Approach to Smart
Grid Security
A wide variety of motivations exist for launching an
attack on the power grid, ranging from economic reasons
(e.g., reducing electricity bills), to pranks, and all the way
to terrorism (e.g., threatening people by controlling elec-
tricity and other life-critical resources). The emerging
smart grid, while benefiting the benign participants (con-
sumers, utility companies), also provides powerful tools
for adversaries.
The smart grid will reach every house and building,
giving potential attackers easy access to some of the grid
components. While incorporating information technology
(IT) systems and networks, the smart grid will be exposed to
a widerange ofsecuritythreats[5]. Itslarge scalealso makes
it nearly impossible to guarantee security for every single
subsystem.Furthermore,thesmartgridwillbenotonlylarge
but also very complex. It needs to connect different systems
and networks, from generation facilities and distribution
equipment to intelligent end points and communication
networks, which are possibly deregulated and owned by
several entities. It can be expected that the heterogeneity,
diversity, and complexity of smart grid components may
introduce new vulnerabilities, in addition to the common
onesininterconnectednetworksandstand-alonemicrogrids
[3]. To make the situation even worse, the sophisticated
control, estimation, and pricing algorithms incorporated in
the grid may also create additional vulnerabilities.
The first-ever control system malware called Stuxnet
was found in July 2010. This malware, targeting vulnerable
S C A D As y s t e m s ,r a i s e sn e wq u e s t i o n sa b o u tp o w e rg r i d
security [6]. SCADA systems are currently isolated, pre-
venting external access. Malware, however, can spread
using USB drives and can be specifically crafted to
Fig. 1. Duringoff-peaktimeperiods,inexpensiveelectricpowercanbe
used without restrictions (e.g., diverted to energy storage). During
peaktimeperiods,someapplianceswillbetemporarilyturnedoff,and
stored energy is used. (a) Power usage during off-peak time period.
(b) Power usage during peak time period.
Fig. 2. The peak demand for electricity will be reduced by the use of
smart appliances, local generators, and/or local energy storage.
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thermore, increasingly interconnected smart grids will
unfortunately provide external access which in turn can
lead to compromise and infection of components.
Many warnings concerning the security of smart grids
are appearing [7]–[12] and some guidelines have been
published,suchasNISTIR7628[3]andNISTSP1108[13].
This paper argues that a new approach to security, bringing
together cyber security and system theory under the name
of cyber–physical security (CPS), is needed to address the
requirements of complex, large-scale infrastructures like
the smart grid. In such systems, cyber attacks can cause
disruptions that transcend the cyber realm and affect the
physical world. Stuxnet is a clear example of a cyber attack
used to induce physical consequences. Conversely physical
attacks can affect the cyber system. For example, the
integrityofametercanbecompromisedbyusingashuntto
bypass it. Secrecy can be broken by placing a compromised
sensor beside a legitimate one. As physical protection of all
assets of large-scale physical systems, such as the smart
grid, is economically infeasible, there arises the need to
develop methods and algorithms that can detect and
counter hybrid attacks. Based on the discussions at the
Army Research Office workshop on CPS security in 2009,
we classify current attacks on cyber–physical systems into
four categories and provide examples to illustrate our
classification in Table 1. Although cyber security and
system theory have achieved remarkable success in
defending against pure cyber or pure physical attacks,
neither of them alone is sufficient to ensure smart grid
security, due to hybrid attacks. Cyber security is not
equipped to provide an analysis of the possible conse-
quences of attacks on physical systems. System theory is
usually concerned with properties such as performance,
stability, and safety of physical systems. Its theoretical
framework, while well consolidated, does not provide a
complete modeling of the IT infrastructure.
In this paper, we propose to combine system theory
and cyber security to ultimately build a science of cyber–
physical security. Toward this goal, it is important to
develop cyber–physical security models capable of inte-
grating dynamic systems and threat models within a
unified framework. We believe that cyber–physical secu-
rity can not only address problems that cannot be currently
solved but provide new improved solutions for detection,
response, reconfiguration, and restoration of system func-
tionalities while keeping the system operating. We also
b e l i e v et h a ts o m ee x i s t i n gm o d e l i n gf o r m a l i s m sc a nb e
used as a starting point toward a systematic treatment of
cyber–physical security. Game theory [14] can capture the
adversarial nature of the interaction between an attacker
and a defender. Networked control systems [15] aim at
integrating computing and communication technologies
with system theory, providing a common modeling
framework for cyber–physical systems. Finally, hybrid
dynamic systems [16] can capture the discrete nature of
events such as attacks on control systems.
The rest of the paper motivates the need for cyber–
physical security in the context of the smart grid. Section II
reviews cyber threats and countermeasures. Section III
describes system-theoretic approaches to contingency ana-
lysis and detection of anomalies in the sensory system.
Section IV shows how methods from either domain may be
incapable to address specific security threats. Section V
provides examples of the unique features of cyber–physical
security. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper with
future research directions.
II. CYBER SECURITY APPROACHES
This section delineates cyber security approaches to smart
grid security.
A. System Model
As Fig. 3 shows, smart grids consist of four compo-
nents: generation, transmission, distribution, and con-
s u m p t i o n .I nt h ec o n s u m p t i o nc o m p o n e n t ,c u s t o m e r su s e
Table 1 Taxonomy of Attacks and Consequences in Cyber and Physical Systems
Fig. 3. A cyber security view of smart grid.
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and their usage of electricity will be measured by an en-
hanced metering device, called a smart meter. The smart
meter is one of the core components of the advanced
metering infrastructure (AMI) [17]. The meter can be
collocated and interact with a gateway of a home-area
network (HAN) or a business-area network (BAN). For
simple illustration, we denote a smart meter in the figure
as a gateway of a HAN. A neighbor-area network (NAN) is
formed under one substation, where multiple HANs are
hosted. Finally, a utility company may leverage a wide-area
network (WAN) to connect distributed NANs.
B. Cyber Security Requirements
In this section, we analyze the information security
requirements for smart grids. In general, information se-
curity requirements for a system include three main secu-
rity properties: confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Confidentiality prevents an unauthorized user from ob-
taining secret or private information. Integrity prevents an
unauthorized user from modifying the information. Avail-
ability ensures that the resource can be used when
requested.
As shown in Fig. 4, price information, meter data, and
control commands are the core information exchanged in
smart grids which we consider in this paper.
While more types of information are exchanged in
reality, these core information types provide a comprehen-
sive sample of security issues.
We now examine the importance of protecting the core
information types with respect to the main security pro-
perties. The degree of importance for price information,
control commands, and meter data is equivalent to the use
cases of NISTIR 7628 [3], to which we added the degree of
importance for software. The most important requirement
for protecting smart grids are outlined below.
• Confidentiality of power usage: Confidentiality of
meter data is important, because power usage data
provides information about the usage patterns for
individual appliances, which can reveal personal
activities through nonintrusive appliance monitor-
ing [18]. Confidentiality of price information and
control commands are not important in cases
where it is public knowledge. Confidentiality of
software should not be critical, because the secu-
rity of the system should not rely on the secrecy of
the software, but only on the secrecy of the keys,
according to Kerckhoffs’s principle [19].
• Integrity of data, commands, and software:I n t e g r i t y
of price information is critical. For instance, nega-
tive prices injected by an attacker can cause an
electricity utilization spike as numerous devices
would simultaneously turn on to take advantage of
the low price. Although integrity of meter data and
commands is important, their impact is mostly li-
mited to revenue loss. On the other hand, integrity
of software is critical since compromised software
or malware can control any device and grid
component.
• Availability against DoS/DDoS attacks: Denial-of-
service (DoS) attacks are resource consumption
attacks that send fake requests to a server or a
network, and distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks are
accomplished by utilizing distributed attacking
s o u r c e ss u c ha sc o m p r o m i s e ds m a r tm e t e r sa n d
appliances. In smart grids, availability of informa-
tion and power is a key aspect [20]. More
specifically, availability of price information is
critical due to serious financial and possibly legal
implications. Moreover, outdated price informa-
tion can adversely affect demand. Availability of
commands is also important, especially when turn-
ing a meter back on after completing the payment
of an electric bill. On the other hand, availability of
meter data (e.g., power usage) may not be as cri-
tical because the data can usually be read at a later
point.
From the above discussion, we can summarize the im-
portance of data, commands, and software, which are
shown in Table 2. BHigh[ risk implies that a property of
certain information is very important/critical, and
Bmedium[ and Blow[ risks classify properties that are
important and noncritical, respectively. This classification
enables prioritization of risks, to focus effort on the most
critical aspects first. For example, integrity of price
information is more important than its confidentiality;
consequently, we need to focus on efficient cryptographic
authentication mechanisms before encryption.
C. Attack Model
To launch an attack, an adversary must first exploit
entry points, and upon successful entry, an adversary can
deliver specific cyber attacks on the smart grid infrastruc-
ture. In the following sections, we describe this attacker
model in detail.
1) Attack Entry Points: In general, strong perimeter de-
fense is used to prevent external adversaries from access-
ing information or devices within the trusted grid zone.
Fig. 4. Information flows to/from a smart meter including price
information, control commands, and meter data.
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provide numerous potential entry points as follows.
• Inadvertent infiltration through infected devices:
Malicious media or devices may be inadvertently
infiltrated inside the trusted perimeter by person-
nel. For example, USB memory sticks have become a
popular tool to circumvent perimeter defenses: a
fewstrayUSB sticksleft in publicspacesare picked
up by employees and plugged into previously se-
cure devices inside the trusted perimeter, enabling
malware on the USB sticks to immediately infect
the devices. Similarly, devices used both inside and
outside the trusted perimeter can get infected with
malware when outside, and infiltrate that malware
when used inside. Common examples are corpo-
rate laptops that are privately used at home over
the weekend.
• Network-based intrusion: Perhaps the most com-
mon mechanism topenetrate a trusted perimeter is
through a network-based attack vector. Exploiting
poorly configured firewalls for both misconfigured
inbound and faulty outbound rules is a common
entry point, enabling an adversary to insert a mali-
cious payload onto the control system.
Backdoors and holes in the network perimeter may be
caused by components of the IT infrastructure with vulne-
rabilities or misconfigurations. Networking devices at the
perimeter (e.g., fax machines, forgotten but still connected
modems) can be manipulated for bypassing proper access
control mechanisms. In particular, dialup access to remote
terminal units (RTUs) is used for remote management, and
an adversary can directly dial into modems attached to
field equipment, where many units do not require a pass-
word for authentication or have unchanged default pass-
words. Further, adversaries can exploit vulnerabilities of
the devices and install backdoors for future access to the
prohibited area. Exploiting trusted peer utility links is ano-
ther potential network-based entry point.
An attacker could wait for a legitimate user to connect
to the trusted control system network via VPN and then
hijack that VPN connection. The network-based intrusions
described above are particularly dangerous because they
enable a remote adversary to enter the trusted control-
system network.
• Compromised supply chain: An attacker can pre-
install malicious codes or backdoors into a device
prior to shipment to a target location, called
supply chain attacks. Consequently, the need for
security assurance in the development and man-
ufacturing process for sourced software, firmware,
and equipment is critical for safeguarding the
cyber supply chain involving technology vendors
and developers.
• Malicious insider:A ne m p l o y e eo rl e g i t i m a t eu s e r
who is authorized to access system resources can
perform actions that are difficult to detect and
prevent. Privileged insiders also have intimate
knowledge of the deployed defense mechanisms,
which they can often easily circumvent. Trivial
accessibility to smart grid components will in-
crease the possibility of escalating an authorized
access to a powerful attack.
2) Adversary Actions: Once an adversary gains access to
the power control network, he can perform a wide range of
attacks. Table 3 lists actions that an adversary can perform
to violate the main security properties (confidentiality,
integrity, availability) for the core types of information.
We classify more specific cyber attacks that lead to either
cyber or physical consequences.
Cyber consequences:
• Malware spreading and controlling devices:A na d -
versary can develop malware and spread it to infect
smart meters [21] or company servers. Malware
can be used to replace or add any function to a
device or a system such as sending sensitive infor-
mation or controlling devices.
• Vulnerabilities in common protocols:S m a r tg r i d
components will use existing protocols, inheriting
the vulnerabilities on the protocols. Common
protocols may include TCP/IP, and remote proce-
dure call (RPC).
Table 2 The Importance of Security Properties for Data, Commands, and Software
Table 3 Threat Type Classification as Caused by Attacking Security Properties
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cord their activities onto a database on the control
system network then mirror logs into the business
network. A skilled attacker can gain access to the
database on the business network, and the business
network gives a path to the control system net-
work. Modern database architectures allow this
type of attack if they are improperly configured.
• Compromising communication equipments:A na t -
tacker can potentially reconfigure or compromise
some of the communication equipment, such as
multiplexers.
• Injecting false information on price and meter data:
An adversary can send packets to inject false infor-
mation on current or future prices, or send wrong
meter data to a utility company. Results of in-
jecting false prices, such as negative pricing, will
be power shortage or other significant damages on
the target region. Results of sending wrong data
include reduced electric bills for economic da-
mages due to the loss of revenue of a utility com-
pany. Also, fake information can give huge
financial impacts on electricity markets [12].
• Eavesdropping attacks: An adversary can obtain
sensitive information by monitoring network
traffic, which results in privacy breaches by steal-
ing power usage, disclosure of the controlling
structure of smart grids and future price informa-
tion. Such eavesdropping can be used for gathering
information to perpetrate further crimes. For ex-
ample, an attacker can gather and examine net-
work traffic to deduce information from
communication patterns, and even encrypted com-
munication can be susceptible to traffic analysis
attacks.
• Modbus security issues:AS C A D Ap r o t o c o lo fn o t e -
worthy concern is the Modbus protocol [22],
which is widely used in industrial control applica-
tions such as in water, oil, and gas infrastructures.
The Modbus protocol defines the message struc-
ture and communication rules used by process
control systems to exchange SCADA information
for operating and controlling industrial processes.
Modbus is a simple client-server protocol that was
originally designed for low-speed serial communi-
cation in process control networks. Given that the
Modbus protocol was not designed for highly
security-critical environments, several attacks are
possible.
1) Broadcast message spoofing: This attack in-
volves sending fake broadcast messages to
slave devices.
2) Baseline response replay:T h i sa t t a c ki n v o l v e s
recording genuine traffic between a master
and a field device, and replaying some of the
recorded messages back to the master.
3) Direct slave control: This attack involves lock-
ing out a master and controlling one or more
field devices.
4) Modbus network scanning: This attack involves
sending benign messages to all possible ad-
dresses on a Modbus network to obtain
information about field devices.
5) Passive reconnaissance: This attack involves
passively reading Modbus messages or net-
work traffic.
6) Response delay: This attack involves delaying
response messages so that the master re-
ceives out-of-date information from slave
devices.
7) Rogue interloper: This attack involves attacking
a computer with the appropriate (serial or
Ethernet) adapters to an unprotected com-
munication link.
Physical consequences:
• Interception of SCADA frames: An attacker can use a
protocol analysis tool for sniffing network traffic
to intercept SCADA Distributed Network Protocol
3.0 (DNP3) frames and collect unencrypted
p l a i n t e x tf r a m e st h a tw o u l dp r o v i d ev a l u a b l ei n -
formation, such as source and destination ad-
dresses. This intercepted data, which include
control and setting information, could then be
used at a later date on another SCADA system or
intelligent equipment device (IED), thereby shut-
ting services down at worst or at the minimum
causing service disruptions.
• Malware targeting industrial control systems:A n
attacker can successfully inject worms into vulne-
rable control systems and reprogram industrial
control systems. A well-known example is Stuxnet
as discussed in Section I.
• DoS/DDoS attacks on networks and servers:A n
adversary can launch a DoS/DDoS attack against
various grid components including smart meters,
networking devices, communication links, and uti-
lity business servers. If the attack is successful,
then electricity cannot be controlled in the target
region. Furthermore, power supply can be stopped
from the result of the attack.
• S e n d i n gf a k ec o m m a n d st os m a r tm e t e r si nar e g i o n :
An adversary can send fake commands to a device
or a group of devices in a target region. For exam-
ple, sending disconnect messages to smart meters
in a region will stop power delivery to that region.
As well, invalid switching of electric devices can
result in unsafe connections which may lead to
burn the target place on fire. Thus, insecure com-
munication in smart grids may be able to threaten
human life.
The attacks mentioned above are not exhaustive, but
they serve to illustrate risks to help develop secure grid
Mo et al.: Cyber–Physical Security of a Smart Grid Infrastructure
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D. Countermeasures
1) Key Management: Key management is a fundamental
approach for information security. Shared secret keys or
authentic public keys can be used to achieve secrecy and
authenticity for communication. Authenticity is especially
important to verify the origin which in turn is key for
access control.
The key setup in a system defines the root of trust. For
example, a system based on public/private keys may define
the public key of a trust center as the root of trust, and the
trust center’s private key is used to sign certificates and
delegate trust to other public keys. In a symmetric-key
system, each entity and the trust center would set up
shared secret keys and establish additional trust relation-
ships among other nodes by leveraging the trust center, as
in Kerberos.
The challenge in this space is key management across a
very broad and diverse infrastructure. As a recent NIST
report documents [3], several dozens of secure communi-
cation scenarios are required, ranging from communica-
tion between the power distributor and the smart meter to
communication between equipment and field crews. For
all these communication scenarios, keys need to be set up
to ensure secrecy and authenticity. Besides the tremen-
dous diversity of equipment, there is also a wide variety of
stakeholders: government, corporations, and consumers.
Even secure e-mail communication among different corpo-
rations is a challenge today; ye tt h es e c u r ec o m m u n i c a t i o n
between equipment from one corporation and a field crew
of another one poses numerous additional challenges. By
adding a variety of key management operations to the mix
(e.g., key refresh, key revocation, key backup, key recov-
ery), the complexity of key management becomes truly
formidable. Moreover, business, policy, and legal aspects
also need to be considered, as a message signed by a private
key can hold the key owner liable for the contents. A
recent publication from NIST providesa goodguidelinefor
designing cryptographic key management systems to
support an organization [23], but the diverse requirements
of smart grid infrastructures are not considered.
2) Secure Communication Architecture: Designing a
highly resilient communication architecture for a smart
grid is critical to mitigate attacks while achieving high-
level availability. Here are the required components.
• Network topology design: A network topology repre-
sents the connectivity structure among nodes,
which can have an impact on the robustness
against attacks [24]. Thus, connecting networking
nodes to be highly resilient under attack can be
the basis to build a secure communication
architecture.
• Secure routing protocol:Ar o u t i n gp r o t o c o lo na
network is to build logical connectivity among
nodes, and one simplest way to prevent commu-
nication is by attacking the routing protocol. By
compromising a single router and by injecting
bogus routes, all communication in the entire net-
work can come to a standstill. Thus, we need to
c o n s i d e rt h es e c u r i t yo far o u t i n gp r o t o c o lr u n n i n g
on top of a network topology.
• Secure forwarding: An adversary who controls a
router can alter, drop, and delay existing data pa-
ckets or inject new packets. Thus, securing indi-
vidual routers and detecting malicious behaviors
will be required to achieve secure forwarding.
• End-to-end communication: From end-to-end per-
spective, secrecy and authenticity of data are the
most crucial properties. Secrecy prevents an eaves-
dropper from learning the data content, while au-
thenticity (sometimes referred to as integrity)
enables the receiver to verify that the data indeed
originated from the sender, thus preventing an
attacker from altering the data.
While numerous protocols exist (e.g., SSL/TLS, IPsec,
SSH), some low-power devices may need lightweight
protocols to perform the associated cryptography.
• Securebroadcasting:Manysmartgridenvironments
rely on broadcast communication. Especially for
price dissemination, authenticity of the informa-
tion isimportant, because an adversary could inject
anegativecostandcauseanelectricityutilizationto
spike when numerous devices simultaneously turn
on to take advantage of the low price.
• DoS defense: Given all the above mechanisms, an
adversary can still prevent communication by
mounting a DoS attack. For example, if an adver-
sary controls many end points after compromising
t h e m ,h ec a nu s et h e s ee n dp o i n t st os e n dd a t at o
flood the network. Hence, enabling communica-
tion under these circumstances is crucial, for ex-
ample to perform network management operations
to defend against the attack. Moreover, electricity
itself, rather than communication networks, can be
a target of DoS attacks [25].
• Jamming defense: To prevent an external adversary
from jamming the wireless network, jamming de-
tection mechanisms can be used to detect attacks
and raise alarms. A multitude of methods to
counter jamming attacks has been developed [26],
enabling operation during jamming.
3) System and Device Security: An important area is to
address vulnerabilities that enable exploitation through
software-based attacks, where an adversary either exploits
a software vulnerability to inject malicious code into a
1http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/csvuls.html
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privileges to install and execute malicious code. The chal-
lenge in such an environment is to obtain Bground truth[
when communicating with a potentially compromised sys-
t e m :I st h er e s p o n s es e n tb yl e g i t i m a t ec o d eo rb ym a l -
w a r e ?A ni l l u s t r a t i o no ft h i sp r o b l e mi sw h e nw ea t t e m p t
to run a virus scanner on a potentially compromised
systemVIf the virus scanner returns the result that no
virus is present, is that really because no virus could be
identified or is it because the virus has disabled the virus
scanner? A related problem is that current virus scanners
contain an incomplete list of virus signatures, and the
absence of a virus detection could be because the virus
scanner does not yet recognize the new virus.
In the context of smart grids, researchers have pro-
posed several techniques to provide prevention and de-
tection mechanisms against malware. McLaughlin et al.
have proposed diversity for embedded firmware [27] to
avoid an apocalyptic scenario where malware pervasively
compromises equipment, because each device executes
different software, thus avoiding common vulnerabilities.
A promising new approach to provide remote code
verification is a technology called attestation. Code attest-
ation enables an external entity to inquire the software
that is executing on a system in a way that prevents mal-
ware from hiding. Since attestation reveals a signature of
executing code, even unknown malware will alter that
signature and can thus be detected. In this direction,
LeMay et al. have studied hardware-based approaches for
attestation [28], [29]. Software-based attestation is an
approach that does not rely on specialized hardware, but
makes some assumptions that the verifier can uniquely
communicate with the device under verification [30].
Shah etal.have demonstrated the feasibility of this concept
on SCADA devices [31].
III. SYSTEM-THEORETIC APPROACHES
In this section, we want to focus on system-theoretic
approaches to the real-time security of smart grids, which
encompasses two main parts: contingency analysis (CA)
and system monitoring [32].
A. System Model
Fig. 5 shows a typical system-theoretic view of an
IEEE 14-bus system. The focus of such a view is the
physical interactions between each component in the
grid, while the cyber view focuses on the modeling of IT
infrastructures.
Suppose the grid consists of N buses. Let us define the
active power flow, reactive power flow, the voltage magni-
tude, and phase angle for each bus as Pi, Qi, Vi,a n d i,
respectively.
2 Let us define vectors P, Q, V,a n d  as the
collections of Pi, Qi, Vi,a n d i, respectively.
The relationship between node current Ik and voltage





where Yki is the admittance between bus k and i.A sa
result, the active and reactive power at node k are given by




where Ik means complex conjugate. It can be seen that V
and   are the states of the system since they completely
determine power flow P and Q.L e tu sd e f i n et h es t a t e
3 x as
x ¼½ V0;  1;...;  N 1 
0 2 R
2N 1. The remote terminal units
(RTUs) provide the system’s measurements. Let us denote
as z 2 R
m the collection of all measurements, assumed to
satisfy the following equation:
z ¼ hðxÞþv (2)
where h : R
2N 1 ! R
m represents the sensor model and
v 2 R
m denotes the measurement noise, which is further
assumed to be Gaussian with mean 0 and covariance R.
Here we briefly introduce the weighted least square
(WLS) estimator [34], as it is widely used in practice.
Define the estimated state as ^ x, and the residue vector as
r ¼ z   hð^ xÞ, which measures the inconsistency between
Fig. 5. A typical system-theoretic view of an IEEE standard
14-bus system.
2We assume that bus N is the reference bus and the phase angle of it
is 0.
3The state does not include  N as its phase angle is assumed to be 0.
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tries to find the best estimation ^ x with minimum
inconsistency. In particular, the WLS estimator computes
^ x based on the following minimization problem:
^ x ¼ argmin^ x rTR 1r: (3)
B. Security Requirements
The U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) Smart Grid Sys-
tem Report [35] summarizes six characteristics of the smart
grid, which were further developed from the seven charac-
teristics of BCharacteristics of the Modern Grid[ [36]
published by the National Energy Technology Laboratory
(NETL). With respect to security, the most important
characteristic identified by DoE is to operate resiliently even
during disturbances, attacks, and natural disasters.
In real-time security settings, the following properties
are essential for the resilience of smart grids:
1) the power system should withstand a prespecified
list of contingencies;
2) the accuracy of state estimation should degrade
gracefully with respect to sensor failures or attacks.
The first property is passive and prevention based. The
second property enables the detection of attacks or abnor-
malities and helps the system operator actively mitigate
the damage.
C. Attack Model
A contingency can usually be modeled as a change in
vectors P;Q;V;  (such as a loss of a generator) or as a
change in the admittance Yki (such as an opening trans-
mission line). For system monitoring, corrupted measure-
ments can be modeled as an additional term in (2), i.e.,
za ¼ z þ u ¼ hðxÞþv þ u (4)
where u ¼½ u1;...;um 
0 2 R
m and ui 6¼ 0onlyifthesensor
i is corrupted.
D. Countermeasures
1) Contingency Analysis: Contingency analysis checks if
the steady-state system is outside operating region for each
contingency [32]. However, the number of potential
contingencies is high for large power grids. Due to real-
time constraints, it is impossible to evaluate each con-
tingency. As a result, in practice, usually only BN   1[
contingencies are evaluated, via considering single failure
cases instead of multiple ones. Moreover, the list of possi-
ble contingencies is usually screened and ranked. After
that, a selected number of contingencies is evaluated. If a
violation occurs, the system needs to determine the con-
trol actions that can mitigate or completely eliminate the
violation.
2) Bad Data Detection: Bad data detector such as  2 or
largest normalized residue detector [34] detects the cor-
ruption in measurement z by checking the residue vector r.
For uncorrupted measurements, it is expected that the
residue vector r will be small since z should be consistent
with (2). However, such a detection scheme has an in-
herent vulnerability as different z vectors can generate the
sameresidue r. By exploiting this vulnerability, Liu et al.[10]
show that an adversary can inject a stealthy input u into the
measurements to change the state estimate ^ x and fool the
bad data detector at the same time. Sandberg et al. [37]
consider how to find a sparse stealthy u, which enables the
adversary to launch an attack with a minimum number of
compromised sensors. To counter such a vulnerability,
Kosut et al. [38] suggest using the prior knowledge of the
state x to help detecting malicious sensors.
IV. THE NEED FOR CYBER–PHYSICAL
SECURITY
Table 4 summarizes the discussion in Sections II and III.
The cyber security approaches focus on the IT infrastruc-
tures of the smart grid while system-theoretic approaches
focus more on the physical aspects. We argue that pure
cyber or system-theoretic approaches are insufficient to
Table 4 Comparison Between Cyber and System-Theoretic Security
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reasons:
1) The system and attack models of both approaches are
incomplete: Cyber security does not model the
physical system. Therefore, cyber security can
hardly defend against physical attacks. For exam-
ple, cyber security protects the integrity of mea-
surements data by using secure devices and
communication protocols.
However, integrity of sensors can be broken by
modifying the physical state of the system locally,
e.g., shunt connectors can be placed in parallel with
a meter to bypass it and cause energy theft. In that
case, no purely cyber security method can be
employed to effectively detect and counter such
attacks, since the cyber portion of the system is not
compromised.Thus,eventhegoalsofcybersecurity
cannot be achieved by pure cyber approaches in
cyber–physical systems. Moreover, cyber security is
not well equipped to predict the effect of cyber
attacksandcountermeasuresonthephysicalsystem.
For example, the DoS attacks can cause drops of
measurements data and control command, which
can lead to instability of the grid. A countermeasure
toDoSattacksistoisolatesomeofthecompromised
nodes from the network, which may result in even
more severe stability issues. Thus, an understanding
of the physical system is crucial even for defending
against cyber attacks.
On the other hand, the system-theoretic model does
not model the whole IT infrastructures, but usually
just a high level abstraction. As a result of this over-
simplification of the cyber world, it difficult to
analyze the effect of cyber attacks on physical
systems. For example, in DoS attacks, some control
commands may be dropped due to limited band-
width. However, the effect of the lossy communica-
tioncannotbeevaluatedinapurepowerflowmodel.
2) The security requirements of both approaches are
incomplete and the security of the smart grid requires
both of them: System level concerns, such as stabi-
lity, safety, and performance, have to be guaran-
teed in the event of cyber attacks. Cyber security
metrics do not currently include the aforemen-
tioned metrics. On the other hand, system theory
is not concerned with secrecy of information.
Furthermore, it usually treats integrity and avail-
ability of information as intermediate steps to
achieve stability, safety, or better performance. In
the design of secure smart grid it is important to
identify a set of metrics that combines and ad-
dresses the concerns of the two communities.
3) The countermeasures of both approaches have draw-
backs: System-theoretic methods will not be able
to detect any attack until it acts on the physical
system. Furthermore, since system theory is based
on approximate models and is subject to unknown
disturbances, there will always be a discrepancy
between the observed and the expected behavior.
Most of the attack can bypass system theory-based
intrusion detection algorithms with a small proba-
bility, which could be detrimental. Last, contin-
gency analysis generally focuses on N   1
contingencies, which is usually enough for inde-
pendent equipment failures. However, as we in-
tegrate the IT infrastructures into the smart grid,
it is possible that several contingencies will hap-
p e ns i m u l t a n e o u s l yd u r i n ga na t t a c k .
On the other hand, cyber countermeasures alone
are not sufficient to guarantee security of the
smart grid. History has so far taught that cyber
security is not always bulletproof. As operational
continuity is essential, the system must be built to
withstand and operate even in the event of zero-
day vulnerabilities or insider threats, resorting to
rapid reconfiguration to provide graceful degra-
dation of performance in the face of an attack. As a
large blackout canhappen in a few minutes [39], it
is questionable that pure cyber security ap-
proaches can react fast enough to withstand
zero-day vulnerability exploits or insider attacks.
V. CYBER–PHYSICAL SECURITY
As shown in Section IV, both cyber and system-theoretic
approaches are essential for the security of smart grids. In
this section, we want to use two examples to show how the
combination of cyber and system-theoretic approaches
together can provide better security level than traditional
methods. In the first example, we show how system-
theoretic countermeasures can be used to defend against a
replay attack, which is a cyber attack on the integrity of the
measurement data. In the second example, we show how
systemtheorycanguidecybersecurityinvestmentstrategies.
A. Defense Against Replay Attacks
In this example, we consider defense against replay
attack, where an adversary records a sequence of sensor
measurements and replays the sequence afterwards.
Replay attacks are cyber attacks which break the integrity
or more precisely the freshness of measurements data. It is
worth mentioning that Stuxnet [40] employed a replay
attack of this type to cover its goal of damaging the centri-
fuges in a nuclear facility by inducing excessive vibrations
or distortions. While acting on the physical system, the
malware was reporting old measurements indicating nor-
mal operations. This integrity attack, clearly conceived and
operated in the cyber realm, exploited four zero-day vul-
nerabilities to break the cyber infrastructures and it re-
mained undiscovered for several months after its release.
Therefore, a pure cyber approach to replay attacks may not
be able to react fast enough before the system is damaged.
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tion, a methodology that can detect such attacks indepen-
dently of the type of attack used to gain access to the
control system. This algorithm [41] was developed long
before Stuxnet appeared and preceded it. We are reporting
as u m m a r yb e l o w .
To achieve greater generality, the method is presented
for a generic control system. We assume the sensors are
monitoring a system with the following state dynamics:
xkþ1 ¼ Fxk þ Buk þ wk (5)
where xk 2 R
n is the vector of state variables at time k,
wk 2 R
n is the process noise at time k,a n dx0 is the initial
state. We assume wk;x0 are independent Gaussian random
variables, x0  Nð   x0; Þ, wk  Nð 0;QÞ.
For each sampling period k,t h et r u em e a s u r e m e n t
equation of the sensors can be written as
zk ¼ Hxk þ vk (6)
where zk 2 R
m is a collection of all the measurements
from sensors at time k and vk  Nð 0;RÞ is the measure-
ment noise independent of x0 and wk.
We assume that an attacker records a sequence of
measurements from time T0 to time T0 þ T   1a n d
replays it from time T0 þ T to time T0 þ 2T   1, where
T0   0;T   1. As a result, the corrupted measurements za
k
received by the system operator are
za
k ¼
zk; 0   k   T0 þ T   1
zk T; T0 þ T   k   T0 þ 2T   1:
 
(7)
Our goal is to design an estimator, a controller and a
detector such that:
1) the system is stable when there is no replay attack;
2) the detector can detect the replay attack with a
high probability.
We propose the following design of a fixed gain
estimator, a fixed gain controller with random disturbance
and a  2 detector. In particular, our estimator takes the
following form:
^ xkþ1 ¼ F^ xk þ Buk þ Krkþ1; ^ x0 ¼   x0: (8)
where K is the observation gain matrix and the residue rk is
computed as
rkþ1 ¼ za
kþ1   CðF^ xk þ BukÞ: (9)
Our controller takes the following form:
uk ¼ L^ xk þ  uk (10)
where L is the control gain matrix and  uks are indepen-
dent identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian noises gener-
ated by the controller, with zero mean and covariance Q.
It can be easily shown that the residue rk is a Gaussian
random variable with zero mean when there is no replay.
As a result, with large probability it cannot be far away
from 0. Therefore, we design our filter to trigger an alarm
at time k based on the following event:
gk ¼ r0
kPrk   threshold
  
(11)
where P is a predefined weight matrix. Fig. 6 shows the
diagram of the proposed system.
Wefirstconsiderthestabilityoftheproposedsystem.It
is well known that without  uk, the closed-loop system
without replay is stable if and only if both F   KCF and
F þ BL are stable. Moreover, one can easily prove that
adding  uk does not affect the stability of the system since
 uk isi.i.d. Gaussiandistributed. Hence,toensure thatthe
systemisclosed-loopstablewithoutreplay,weonlyneedto
make F   KCF and F þ BL stable, which can be easily done
as long as the system is both detectable and stabilizable.
Now we want to show our system design can suc-
cessfully detect replay attacks. Consider the residue rk,
where T0 þ T   k   T0 þ 2T   1, then one can prove that
rk ¼ rk T þ CA
k T0 TðI   KCÞ ^ xT0   ^ xT0þT ðÞ
þ
X k T T0 1
i¼0
CA
iBð uk T 1 i    uk 1 iÞ
where A¼ð F þ BLÞðI   KCÞ. The second term above
converges to 0 exponentially fast if A is stable. As a
result, if we do not introduce any random control
disturbance, i.e.,  uk ¼ 0, then the third term vanishes
Fig. 6. System diagram.
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residue rk T when no replay attack is present. Therefore,
the detection rate of the replay attack will be the same as
the false alarm rate. In other words, the detector cannot
distinguish between healthy and corrupted measurements.
However, if  uk 6¼ 0, then the third term will always be
present and therefore the detector can detect replay
attacks with a probability larger than the false alarm rate.
It is worth mentioning that the role of  uk is similar to
an authentication signal on the measurements. When the
system is under normal operation, it is expected that the
measurementszk willreflecttherandomdisturbances uk.
On the other hand, when the replay begins, zk and  uk
becomeindependentofeachother.Therefore,theintegrity
and freshness of the measurements can be protected by
checking the correlation between zk and  uk.T h i s
technique is cyber–physical as it uses the physics of the
systemto authenticate datacoming from the cyberportion.
We now wish to provide a numerical example to illus-
t r a t et h ep e r f o r m a n c eo fo u rd e t e c t i o na l g o r i t h m .W ei m -
pose the following parameters: F ¼ B ¼ Q ¼ R ¼P¼1,
K ¼ 0:9161, L ¼  0:618. One can verify that A¼
0:0321 G 1. The threshold of the filter is chosen such
that the false alarm rate is 1%. We assume that the
recording starts at time 1 and replay starts at time 11. Fig. 7
shows different detection rate over time as Q increases. It
c a nb es e e nt h a tt h ed e t e c t i o nf a i l sw h e nt h e r ei sn o
disturbance. Moreover, a larger disturbance can increase
the performance of the detector.
B. Cyber Security Investment
In this example, we show how system theory can be
used to expose the critical assets to protect and thus
provide important insights toward the allocation of
security investments. In particular, we consider how to
deploy secure sensors to help detect corrupted measure-
ments. We assume the true measurements of sensors fol-
low a linearized model of (2), as discussed in Section III
z ¼ Hx þ v (12)
where z 2 R
m and x 2 R
2N 1 and H 2 R
m ð2N 1Þ is as-
sumed to be of full column rank. For linearized models, (3)
can be solved analytically as
^ xðzÞ¼ð H0R 1HÞ
 1H0R 1z ¼ Kz: (13)
Therefore, the residue can be calculated explicitly as
rðzÞ¼z   H^ xðzÞ¼ð I   HKÞz ¼ Sz (14)
where S ¼ I   HK.
Suppose that an attacker is able to modify the readings
of a subset of sensors. As a result, the corrupted measure-
ments take the following form:
za ¼ z þ u ¼ Hx þ v þ u (15)
where u ¼½ u1;...;um 
0 2 R
m indicatestheerror introduced
by the attacker and ui 6¼ 0o n l yi fs e n s o ri is compromised.
An attack is called stealthy if the residue r does not
changeduringtheattack.Inmathematicalterms,astealthy
attack u satisfies rðzÞ¼rðz þ uÞ.S i n c erðzÞ is linear with
respect to z, we can simplify the above equation to
rðuÞ¼Su ¼ 0( 1 6 )
without loss of generality.
As shown by Liu et al. [10], the  2 detectors fail to
detect a stealthy input u.I nf a c t ,a n yd e t e c t o rb a s e do nr is
ineffective against stealthy attacks as they do not change
the residue r. On the other hand, the stealthy attack can
introduce estimation error to ^ x.
To defend against such attacks, we deploy secure de-
vices, such as tamper resistant devices, to protect the sen-
sors. To this end, we define a sensor i to be secure if it
cannot be compromised, i.e., the corresponding ui is gua-
ranteed to be 0. Let us also define the set of secure sensors
to be Se  f 1;...;mg. An attack u is feasible if and only if
ui ¼ 0f o ra l li 2 Se.
Our security goal is to deploy the minimum number of
secure sensors such that the system can detect the com-
promised nodes. In other words, we want to find the smallest
set Se such that there is no nonzero feasible and stealthy u. Fig. 7. Detection rate over time.
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grid as the current insecure sensors can only be replaced
gradually by secure sensors due to the scale of the grids. As
a result, it is crucial to know which set of sensors to replace
first to achieve better security.
Let us define  ðSeÞ¼diagð 1;...;  mÞ,w h e r e i ¼ 1
if and only if i 2 Se.As e tSe is called observable if and only
if  ðSeÞH is of full column rank. In other words, if a vector
p 2 R
2N 1 6¼ 0, then  ðSeÞHp 6¼ 0. The following theorem
relates the observability of secure sensor set Se with the
existence of a feasible and stealthy attack u.
Theorem 1: T h eo n l yf e a s i b l ea n ds t e a l t h ya t t a c ki su ¼ 0
if and only Se is observable.
Proof: First suppose that Se is observable and u is
stealthy and feasible. As a result,  ðSeÞu ¼ 0. On the other
hand, since u is stealthy, Su ¼ 0, which implies that
HKu ¼ð I   SÞu ¼ u:
Therefore
 ðSeÞHKu ¼  ðSeÞu ¼ 0:
Since  ðSeÞH is full column rank, we know that Ku ¼ 0,
which implies that HKu ¼ 0. Thus
u ¼ð I   HK þ HKÞu ¼ Su þ HKu ¼ 0:
On the other hand, suppose that Se is not observable. Find
x 6¼ 0s u c ht h a t ðSeÞHx ¼ 0. Choose u ¼ Hx.S i n c eH is
full column rank, u 6¼ 0. Moreover,  ðSeÞu ¼  ðSeÞHx ¼
0. Hence, u is feasible. Finally
Su ¼ðI   HKÞu ¼ u   HðH0R 1HÞ
 1H0R 1u
¼Hx   HðH0R 1HÞ
 1H0R 1Hx ¼ 0
which implies that u is stealthy. h
Therefore, finding the smallest Se such that there is no
nonzero feasible and stealthy u is equivalent to finding the
smallest observable Se, which can be achieved using the
following theorem:
Theorem 2: If Se is observable and rankð ðSeÞÞ >
2N   1, then there exists an observable S0
e,w h i c hi sap r o -
per subset of Se.
Proof: Let H0 ¼½ H1;...;Hm ,w h e r eHi 2 R
2N 1.
Since Se is observable, rankð 1H1;...;  mHmÞ¼2N   1.
Without loss of generality, let us assume that Se ¼f 1;...;
lg.T h u s , 1 ¼ ...¼  l ¼ 1a n d lþ1 ¼ ...¼  m ¼ 0,
where l > 2N   1. Since Hi 2 R
2N 1;H1;...;Hl are not
linearly independent. Hence, there exist  1;...;  l 2 R
that are not all zero such that  1H1 þ ...þ  lHl ¼ 0.




which implies that S0
e ¼f 1;...;l   1g is observable. h
It is easy to see that rankð ðSeÞÞ must be no less than
2N   1t om a k eSe observable. As a result, one can use the
procedure described in the proof of Theorem 2 to find the
smallest observable set. Analyses of this kind are essential
to prioritize security investments.
Remark 1: It is worth noticing that the attacks we dis-
cussed in this section are cyber attacks which have physical
consequences. The replay attack itself can render the sys-
tem unstable if the original system is open-loop unstable or
it can enable future attacks on the physical system, as in
the case of Stuxnet. The stealthy integrity attack can cause
large estimation error and potentially damage the system.
Furthermore, our approaches to security are hybrid in
nature. In the first example, we use system-theoretic models




model of the grid to develop an optimal cyber security
countermeasure to integrity attacks. The results illustrate
thatcombiningcybersecurityandsystemtheorycanprovide
better level of security for the smart grid.
VI. CONCLUSION AND
RESEARCH OUTLOOK
With the proliferation of remote management and control
of cyber–physical systems, security plays a critically impor-
tant role, because the convenience of remote management
can be exploited by adversaries for nefarious purposes
from the comfort of their homes.
Compared to current cyber infrastructures, the phys-
ical component of cyber–physical infrastructures adds
significant complexity that greatly complicates security.
On the one hand, the increased complexity will require
more effort from the adversary to understand the system,
but on the other hand, this increased complexity also
introduces numerous opportunities for exploitation. From
the perspective of the defender, more complex systems
require dramatically more effort to analyze and defend,
because of the state–space explosion when considering
combinations of events.
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certainly applicable to securing cyber–physical systems:
techniques for key management, secure communication
(offering secrecy, authenticity, and availability), secure
code execution, intrusion detection systems, etc. Unfor-
tunately, these approaches are largely unaware of the
physical aspects of cyber–physical systems.
System-theoretic approaches already consider physical
aspects in more detail than the traditional security and
cryptographic approaches. These approaches model the
malicious behaviors as either components’ failures, exter-
nal inputs, or noises, analyze their effects on the system,
and design detection algorithms or counter measures to
the attacks. The strength of model-based approaches lies in
aunified framework to model, analyze,detect, and counter
various kinds of cyber and physical attacks. However, the
physical world is modeled with approximations and is
subject to noise, which can result in a deviation of any
model to the reality. Therefore, system-theoretic ap-
proaches are nondeterministic as compared to information
security.
As discussed in this paper, cyber–physical system
securitydemandsadditional security requirements, such as
continuity of power delivery and accuracy of dynamic
pricing, introduced by the physical system. Such require-
ments are usually closely related to the models and states
of the system, which are difficult to address by information
security alone. Therefore, both information security and
system-theory-based security are essential to securing
cyber–physical systems, offering exciting research chal-
lenges for many years to come. h
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